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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  investigate  possible  ways  to  define  consistency  of  assessments  in 
infinite  signaling  games,  i.e.  signaling  games  in  which  the  sets  of types,  messages  and 
answers  are complete, separable metric spaces.  Roughly speaking,  a consistency concept is 
called  appropriate  if  it  implies  Bayesian  consistency  and  copies  the  original  idea  of 
consistency  in  finite  extensive  form  games  as  introduced  by  Kreps  and  Wilson 
(Econometrica,  1982,  50,  863-894).  We  present  a  particular  appropriate  consistency 
concept, which we call strong consistency, and give a characterization of strongly consistent 
assessments,  It turns out that all appropriate consistency concepts are refinements of strong 
consistency.  Finally,  we  define  and  characterize  structurally  consistent  assessments  in 
infinite signaling games. 
JEL classification: C72, C73 
Kevwords." Signaling games: Consistency 
1.  Introduction 
One  of the  most  widely  applied  classes  of games  in  economics  is  the  class  of 
signaling games.  A  signaling game is a  game of incomplete information where two 
players  are  involved: player  1 -  the  sender  -  moves first  and  sends  a  message to 
player  2  -  the  receiver  -  who  observes  the  message  and  chooses  an  answer. 
Player  1 has  more  information  than  player 2,  which  is  modeled  by  assuming  that 
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player l's type is drawn by a  move of nature at the beginning of the game. player 
1 is informed about the outcome of this draw.  but player 2  is not: the distribution 
of nature's move, however, is common knowledge. Player  l's message may serve 
as  a  signal  to  convey  or  hide  information  about  player  l's  type.  Think,  for 
instance, of player 1 as the seller of a car who is informed about the quality of the 
car, and of player 2 as the uninformed potential buyer who is to say yes or no to a 
sales contract specifying the price as well as warranty conditions. 
Signaling  games  -  and,  more  generally,  dynamic  games  of  imperfect  or 
incomplete information  -  are  analyzed by  considering  not  only  the  strategies of 
the  players  but  also  the  beliefs  that  an  uninformed  player may  have  about  his 
information sets.  In a  signaling game as described above, an  assessment is a  pair 
of strategies, together with a probability distribution (beliefs), assessed by player 2 
over  the  possible  types  of player  1.  Common  to  all  kinds  of Nash  equilibrium 
refinements  considered  in  the  literature  on  signaling  games  is  the  sequetztial 
rationality  requirement,  which  says that  the  players"  strategies are best responses 
to each other,  where  player 2  maximizes his  payoff, given  his  beliefs.  Moreover, 
these  beliefs must  be  consistent with  Bayes'  rule  whenever possible  -  i.e.  at  all 
information  sets  reached  with  positive  probability,  where  these  probabilities 
depend  on  the  distribution  of nature's  move  and  player  l's  strategy.  The  latter 
property is called  Bayesian  consistency. 
In a  finite signaling game an assessment is called a  sequential equilibrium  if it 
satisfies  sequential  rationality  and  Bayesian  consistency  (see  Cho  and  Kreps, 
1987). 
An  essential  part  in  the  definition  of  sequential  equilibria for  general  (finite) 
extensive form  games, as introduced by  Kreps  and  Wilson (1982).  is the  consis- 
tency  condition. Roughly, this means that the assessment can be approximated by 
a  sequence of Bayesian-consistent and completely mixed assessments. This condi- 
tion  is  a  kind  of  'trembling  hand"  condition:  the  beliefs  of  a  player  should  be 
consistent,  in  the  limit,  with  the  beliefs  he  would  have  according  to  Bayesian 
updating if all players would  "tremble'. so that each of his information sets would 
be reached with positive probability. Just as is the case with perfect equilibria, the 
requirement  is  that  beliefs  be  consistent  with  some  trembles,  not  with  all 
trembles. 
Moreover,  consistency  of  assessments  can  be  viewed  as  a  condition  that 
requires  the  beliefs to  reflect and  respect  the  structure  of information  sets  in  the 
game.  By,  the  structure  of  the  information  sets  we  mean  the  positions  of  the 
information  sets  in  the  game  tree  and  the  way  different  information  sets  are 
connected via actions and chance moves, in infinite extensive form games, such as 
infinite signaling games,  the  collection of information  sets  may be (uncountably) 
infinite.  However,  similarly to  finite  extensive  form  games,  information  sets  in 
infinite  extensive  form  games  have  specific  positions  in  the  (possibly  infinite) 
game  tree  and  are connected in  a  specific way.  This  is the  reason  wh 5  we  think 
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It is well  known that consistency is equivalent to Bayesian consistency in finite 
signaling  games.  This  is  why  the  definition  of  sequential  equilibria  for  finite 
signaling games uses  Bayesian consistency instead of consistency. 
In this paper we try to apply this idea of consistency in infinite signaling games 
where  the  sets  of  types,  messages  and  answers  are  complete  separable  metric 
spaces.  In  the  last  few  years  much  attention  has  been  paid  to  infinite  signaling 
games;  see,  for instance,  Mailath  (1987,  1988) and  Manelli  (1994),  to name just 
three.  In contrast to finite  extensive  form games,  it  is  not obvious how to define 
completely  mixed  assessments  and  convergence of assessments  in  infinite  signal- 
ing games.  Since  the  concept of consistency,  depends  on  the  way in  which  these 
two  concepts  are  defined,  a  whole  variety  of  definitions  for  consistency  is 
possible.  A  natural  requirement  ['or a  consistency concept is  that  it  should  imply 
Bayesian consistency. This requirement  is called condition A. It turns out that this 
condition  heavily  restricts  the  number  of convergence  concepts  for assessments 
that  can  be  used  in  the  consistency  concept.  An  example  will  show  that  weak 
convergence of probability  measures  is  too weak  for this  purpose.  Therefore,  we 
have  to  use  a  stronger  kind  of  convergence,  which  we  will  call  pointwise 
convergence  ~:f probabilit  3' measures. 
To stay close to the original definition of consistency for finite extensive  form 
games, in an appropriate consistency concept almost all  local strategies and beliefs 
in  the  supporting  sequence  of  assessments  should  converge  pointwise  to  the 
original local strategies and beliefs.  We call this restriction condition C. In a finite 
extensive form game, a completely mixed assessment  induces a  positive probabil- 
ity on every  node  in  the  tree.  If we consider an  infinite  signaling  game  as  a  tree 
where  the  number  of nodes  may  be  (uncountably)  infinite,  a  completely  mixed 
assessment  should  induce  a  positive  probability  on every non-empty,  open  set of 
nodes  in  the  tree.  This  requirement  is  formalized  in  condition  B.  We  call  a 
consistency concept  appropriate  if it  satisfies  the three  conditions A, B  and C. 
After introducing infinite signaling games in Section 2, we formulate conditions 
A, B and C  in Section 3 and explain why these conditions are sensible.  In Section 
4, a particular consistency concept, called  strong consistency,  is introduced and is 
shown to be appropriate. 
In addition,  we provide a characterization of strongly consistent assessments  in 
Section 5.  This  characterization  states  that  an  assessment  is  strongly consistent if 
and only if it  is  Bayesian-consistent and  the  local  beliefs following messages that 
lie  isolated  in  the  message  space  are  absolutely  continuous  with  respect  to  the  a 
priori  probability  distribution  on  the  types.  This  characterization  plays  a  crucial 
role  in the  remainder  of the paper.  A  consequence of this  characterization  is,  for 
example,  the  observation  that  strong  consistency  and  Bayesian  consistency  are 
equivalent in signaling games where the message space contains no isolated points 
or the type space is discrete. 
In Section 6  we show that conditions  A,  B  and  C  imply the conditions  in this 
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infinite  signaling  games  is  a  refinement  of  strong  consistency.  Moreover,  we 
provide an example that shows how strong consistency can exclude some sequen- 
tial equilibria in  signaling games  where  strong  consistency  is  not  equivalent  to 
Bayesian consistency. 
In  Section  7  we  give  a  definition  of  structurally  consistent  assessments  in 
infinite signaling games that  is, from  our viewpoint, a  natural  implication of the 
original idea of structural consistency as given by  Kreps and  Wilson (1982).  We 
conclude this  paper with  a  characterization of the  class of structurally consistent 
assessments. 
Notation 
For a  metric space  X, ~gg(X)  is the set of all finite measures on  X  and  ,~(X) 
denotes the set of probability measures on  X.  By 6~  we denote the Dirac measure 
on  the  point  xeX.  For  an  e>0  and  an  xeX  the  e-neighborhood  of  x  is 
denoted  by  U~,(x). Furthermore,  by  a  v  b  we  denote  the  maximum  of  two 
numbers  a  and  b. 
A  metric space  X  is called separable  if it contains a countable dense subset. A 
Borel subset of  X  is denoted by  X B. 
2. Preliminaries 
In this section we present the model of an infinite signaling game. This model, 
which  is very similar to that of Manelli (1994),  is in our view a  natural extension 
of the finite model. 
2.1.  Infinite signaling games 
An  infinite signaling game  (from  now  on  simply called  signaling game)  is a 
sextuple (T,  M,  A,  u~,  u 2,  T), where  T,  M  and  A  are complete, separable metric 
spaces,  u~  and  u,  are measurable real functions on  T×  M  ×  A, and r  is a  strictly 
positive  probability  measure  on  T  (i.e.  ~-  puts  a  positive  weight  on  every 
non-empty, open  subset of T). 
The  game  is  played according to  the  following rules:  first,  player  l's  type  is 
determined by nature  according to the a  priori distribution ~-.  After observing his 
type, player I  sends a message, m e  M.  Being ignorant of player I's type, player 2 
responds  to  this  message  with  an  answer,  a  e  A.  Finally, the  payoffs  for  both 
players are given by  u~(t, m,  a) and  us(t,  m,  a).  respectively. 
2.2.  Strategies and belief$ 
A  behaz'ior  strategy for player  1 is  a  mapping  o-~  :T-~(M),  such  that  the 
function  t ~  o-l(t)(M B) is  measurable on  T  for every  M B.  So,  for every type  t, 
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A  behaHor strategy.jbr player  2  is a  mapping  (r,  : M  ~3(A),  such  that the 
function  m ~  o-2(m)(AB)  is measurable on  M  for every  A R.  For every message 
m,  o-2(m) defines a  probability measure  on  the answer space  A. 
The probability measures  o-l(t) and  cry(m) are called local strategies. 
A  pair o-= (o-l,  o-2) is called a  behaHor strategy profile (BSP). 
A  belief system  is  a  mapping  /3 : M  ~,~(T),  such  that  the  function  m 
/3(m)(T  B) is measurable for every  T B- 
For  a  message  m  and  Borel  set  T B.  /3(m)(Tu)  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
(subjective) probability that player 2  assigns to the event that player 1 has  a  type 
in  T  B  if he  observes the  message  m.  The  probability measures  /3(m)  are  called 
local beliefs. 
2.3.  Sequential  rationality and Bayesian  consistency 
A  pair  (o-,  /3)  is  called  an  assessment.  An  assessment  (o-,  /3)  is  called 
sequentially  rational  if  the  local  strategy  o-~(t)  maximizes  player  l's  expected 
payoff  for  every  t ~  T  and  if  at  every  message  m,  the  local  strategy  o-2(m) 
maximizes  player 2"s  expected  payoff,  given  his  beliefs  about  player  l's  type. 
Formally, if for every  t •  T  and  ~  •o~(M): 
and if for every  m ~  M  and  a  •,~(A): 
f4fff2(t,•  m,  a)d/3(m)do-_~(m)  _> f ~.u2(1.  m,  a)d/3(m)da. 
Note that  try(t) in the first integral does  not  mean that we integrate over t.  In this 
integral,  t  is  fixed,  and  we  integrate  over  m  with  respect  to  the  probability 
measure  o'l(t). 
A  BSP o-  induces the probability measure  7r '~  on  T ×  M  defined by 
7r "(TB  ×  MB):= frB cr'(t)(MB)  dz. 
Hence,  7r'~(TB  ×  M B) is the probability that player I  has a type in T B and sends a 
message in  M B, given the fact that  o-  is played. 
We denote by  P'~ the marginal distribution on  M  corresponding to 7r'L Hence, 
:  JT 
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An  assessment  ((r,  /3)  is  called  Bavesi(m-con.~istent  if  /3  is  a  conditional 
distribution  for 7r'*. This  means  that for all  T~ ×  M~: 
£  /3(,,,)(f,,)  dP '~: ~'~(T~XM,). 
In finite extensive form games, Bayesian consistency completely determines the 
beliefs  at  all  information  sets  that  are  reached  with  positive  probability.  The 
crucial  difference  between  Bayesian  consistency  in  finite  extensive  form  games 
and Bayesian consistency in infinite  signaling games lies  in the fact that in infinite 
signaling  games,  it  puts  restrictions  on  the  behavior  of beliefs  at  collections  of 
information sets rather than  at  indiHdual  information sets. 
An  assessment  ((r,  /3)  is  called  a  sequential  eq,ilibrium  if it  is  sequentially 
rational  and  Bayesian-consistent.  However.  a  sequential  equilibrium  does  not 
always exist,  as  is  shown by an example  of van  Damme (1987). 
3. Minimal requirements for consistency concepts 
As mentioned earlier,  we investigate  several  possibilities  to define  consistency 
of assessments  in  infinite  signaling  games,  Of course,  there  are  many  different 
ways to do this,  but not all  of them  are equally  meaningful.  To decide  whether a 
given  consistency  concept  is  appropriate,  we  develop  a  system  of  minimal 
requirements  that  such a  concept should satisfy. 
Formally speaking,  a consistency concept is a mapping  ~  that assigns :o every 
signaling  game  1"  a  set  ¢(P)  of assessments.  An assessment  in  4(I ~)  is  called 
('onsisten[  ~v.r.l.  sc. 
An appropriate  consistency concept should,  from our point of view,  reflect the 
idea  of  consistency  as  it  was  defined  by  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982)  for  finite 
extensive  tbrm  games.  This  requirement  can  be  formalized  by  saying  that  a 
consistency concept  ,#  should have the following canonical form: 
"'An assessment  (~r.  /3)  is  consistent  ,a.r.t.  sc  if and  only  if there  is  a  sequence 
(o- k,  /3 ~)k ~ <  of Bayesian-consistent assessments  such that 
( I ) (or ~,  /3 ~) is  completely  mixed  for every  /,  and 
(2) (or< /3a)~,  conrerges  t(, (o-,  /3).'" 
This  canonical  form  does  not  induce  a  unique  consistency  concept,  since  it 
depends  on the  way we define completely mixed assessments  and convergence of 
assessments.  The  particular  definitions  of  completely  mixed  assessments  and 
convergence of assessments  used in  ¢  are called  complete mi_vedne,~s  w.r.t,  q:  and 
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However.  we will not regard every concept  ~  satisfying this canonical form as 
appropriate,  for  reasons  to  become  clear  later.  More  precisely,  we  will  impose 
further requirements  labeled as conditions A, B  and C. 
3.1.  Consistency  should  imply  Bayesian  co~tsistencv 
First of all, an  appropriate consistency concept  should always imply Bayesian 
consistency. 
Condition  A.  Every assessment that is consistent w.r.t.  ¢  should be Bayesian-con- 
sistent. 
This condition may seem easy to fulfill, but,  as we  show  later in this  section, we 
need  a  rather  strong  convergence  concept  in  order  to  satisfy  this  requirement. 
Weak convergence of probability measures,  for example, is not strong enough for 
this purpose. 
3.2.  Restriction  on  completely  mLved  assessment,s 
Next, we put a restriction on the definition of completely mixed assessments. In 
Selten's (1975)  article about perfect equilibria, completely mixed behavior strate- 
gies are used because they induce a  positive probability on every node  in the tree 
of a  finite extensive form  game. 
A  signaling game  can  also  be  interpreted  as  an  extensive  form  game  with  a 
possibly infinite number  of nodes.  The  nodes  that  follow the  actions  of player  I 
are  given  by  pairs  (t.  in)¢  T×M.  Of  course,  in  general,  it  is  not  possible  to 
require that player l's strategy induces a  positive probability on every single node 
in  E ×  M.  This  condition cannot  be  satisfied if,  for example,  f  ×  M  is  uncount- 
able.  However,  Simon  and  Stinchcombe  (1995)  discuss  a  very  natural  way  to 
define completely mixed strategies in the infinite case. They call a  mixed strategy 
in an infinite normal form game  offidl  support  if it puts positive weight on every 
non-empty, open  subset of pure  strategies. 
Combining  the  ideas  of  both  papers,  we  arrive  at  the  following  condition, 
which says that a completely mixed assessment in a  signaling game should always 
induce a  positive probability on  every non-empty, open  subset of nodes (t,  m). 
Condition  B.  Every  assessment (or.  /3)  that  is  completely mixed w.r.t,  q:  should 
have the  property that 
fl  o',( l)( Mb)  dr>O, 
B 
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One  possible  way  to  define  completely  mixed  assessments  is  to  say  that  an 
assessment  (or,  /3)  is  completely  mixed  if  the  local  strategy  cry(t)  is  a  strictly 
positive  probability  measure  on  M  for  every  t.  We  call  such  assessments 
pointwise  completely  mixed.  Obviously, this definition  satisfies  condition B. 
An  important  property  of  completely  mixed  assessments  in  finite  extensive 
form games  is  the  fact that  they  always  induce  strictly  positive  beliefs  at  every 
information  set  if  the  assessment  satisfies  Bayesian  consistency.  In  an  infinite 
signaling  game,  an  assessment  that  is  pointwise  completely mixed  and  Bayesian- 
consistent  does  not  necessarily  have  the  property  that  the  local  belief  /3(m)  is 
strictly  positive  for every  m.  However.  a  similar  but  somewhat  weaker property 
can  be  shown.  It  turns  out  that  for  every  non-empty,  open  subset  T B  the  set 
{ml  /3(m)(T  B) >  O} is  dense  in  m. 
3.3.  Why is  weak com'ergence  not strong  enough? 
A  possible convergence concept that can be used in a consistency concept is the 
so-called  weak concergence  of assessments.  We say that a sequence (or k.  /3 k)k ~ ~:J 
of assessments  converges  weakly  to  an  assessment  (o-,  /3)  if (O'lk(t))~ ~  con- 
verges weakly to  o-t(t) for every  t,  (cry(m)) k ~ ~j  converges weakly to  cr2(m) {'or 
every  m  and (/3k(m))k~ ~j  converges weakly to  /3(m)for every  m. 
Although weak convergence seems  a  very natural  convergence concept in this 
situation,  the  following  example  shows  that  even  the  consistency  concept  that 
makes  use  of  weak  convergence  and  pointwise  completely  mixed  assessments 
does not imply Bayesian consistency and can therefore  not be appropriate. 
Example  1.  Let  q~  be  the  consistency  concept  induced  by  pointwise  complete 
mixedness and weak convergence. Let  F  be a signaling game in which  T =  M = 
[0,  1] and  ~-  is  the uniform distribution  on  T.  We denote the  uniform distribution 
on  [0,  1]  by  u,  and  for  an  interval  Ic[0,  1]  the  uniform  distribution  on  1  is 
denoted by  u 1. 
Now,  we  construct  an  assessment  (~r.  /3)  that  is  consistent  w.r.t.  ¢  but  not 
Bayesian-consistent. 
Let the behavior strategy  o-~  and the belief system  /3  be given by 
cr,(t):=u  forevery  t, 
'lu  2 
3  [o,1,,'21  +  5U[l,,2.1] -  if  m  ~  Q. 
/3(m)  := 
u[0.1.21,  if m ¢  Q. 
Furthermore,  we choose an arbitrary  behavior strategy o-  2  for player 2. 
The assessment (o-,  /3) is  not Bayesian-consistent since 
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but 
f[[0  I  I])  du  = 
.1/2] 
To  show  that  (o',  /3)  is  consistent  w.r.t.  ,~,  we  construct  a  sequence 
(o  "k,  /3k)k~,~  of  assessments  that  are  Bayesian-consistent  and  pointwise  com- 
pletely mixed such that (or k,  /3~)k ~ F::~ converges weakly to (or.  /3). 
For  every  k~t~,  let  Mk:={O,  l/k,  2/k ..... (k-1)/k}  and  let  #k  be  the 
probability  measure  on  M  that puts probability  1/k  on every point in  M k.  It can 
be  shown  that the  sequence (#k)~ ~ ~,~  converges weakly to  u.  (See,  for example. 
Example 25.3  in Billingsley,  1986.) 
For every  k,  we define  or1  k  and  /3k  by 
O'lk(t)  :=  ~H  +  7#  "  if  t  __< V. 
1  •  ift>~ 
[,  • 
/3~(m)  :=  Su[°""2]+~ull"2ll'  if  m~M~" 
/u[0.1/21 .  if m  M t 
Obviously,  trek(t)  is  strictly  positive  tbr  every  t,  and  the  sequence  (o~k(t))k~ p~ 
converges  weakly  to  ~r~(t)  for  every  t.  To  show  that  (/3k(m))k~ ~  converges 
weakly to  /3(m) for all  m,  we distinguish  two cases. 
If m ~  Q, then it follows that  m ~  M ~ tbr every  k.  By construction,  /3k(m) = 
/3(m) for all  k,  which implies  that  /3~(m) converges weakly to  /3(m). 
For  the  case  m ~  Q.  we  need  the  following  lemma,  which  is  formulated  as 
Theorem 2.3  in  Billingsley (1968). 
Lemma 3.1.  Let X  be a  metric space and  #,  #1  is2 ....  probabili O' measures on 
X.  Then,  the  sequence  (i~k)k ~ ~  concerges  weakh"  to  #  if and  only  if ecer3" 
subsequence of ( #~ )k ~ ~  contains a./hrther subsequence that concerges weakly to 
tx. 
Now,  let  m ~  Q  and  (/3k'(m))~ ~,~  a  subsequence  of (/3k(m))k ~ ~.  We  can 
find a  further subsequence  (/3k"(m)) k ~ ~  such that  m ~  M k'' for every  k",  which 
implies that  /3k"(m) =/3(m) for every  k". It follows that (/3k"(m))k ~ ~  converges 
weakly to  /3(m).  By Lemma 3.1  (/3k(m))k ~ ,:j  converges weakly to  /3(m). 
Finally, it can be shown that (o  -k,  /3 k) is  Bayesian-consistent for every  k. This 
implies  that (o-,  /3) is  consistent w.r.t,  q~.  [] 
From the above example we learn that the "weakness" of weak convergence lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  expected  value  of  a  bounded  function  w.r.t,  a  weakly 
convergent sequence of probability measures converges only to the expected value 
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occur in  signaling games  are  typically not continuous.  Therefore,  we  introduce  a 
sharpening  of  weak  convergence,  called  pointwise  com'ergence  of probability 
measures,  which  preserves  the  expected  value  of every  bounded  (continuous  or 
non-continuous) function in the limit. 
3.4.  Pointwise concergenee  of probabilio  measure,s 
Let  X  be a  metric  space and  (/.z  x)k ~ ~  be a  sequence  of probability measures 
on  X.  We  say that  (/.z  ~)~ ~ ~+  eom'erges  pointwise  to  a  probability measure  #  if 
lira #~(X~)  =  #(X~), 
,(  .~ 
for every Borel  set  Xu. 
Obviously+  every  pointwise  convergent  sequence  is  also  weakly  convergent, 
since weak convergence requires only the equation  above to be true for Borel sets 
X~  in  which the boundary has measure zero under  #. 
If we consider the strong metric on  probability measures given by 
d( #.  ~,)  := sup{I  #(X~)  -  v(X~) I [ X~  measurable}, 
it is clear that convergence w.r.t, the strong metric implies pointwise convergence. 
The  following  lemma,  which  is  proved  in  the  appendix,  shows  that  pointwise 
convergence  can  also  be  defined  by  convergence  of  integrals  of  bounded  and 
measurable functions.  J 
Lemma  3.2.  Let  X  be  a  complete  separable  metric  space  and  la,, #1.  tz2 ..... 
probabli U  measures  on X.  Then (#~),,  '+  conrer~es pointwise to #  i(and onh'  i[" 
for ecerv bounded  and measurable function [. 
A  similar characterization holds for weakly convergent sequences: the sequence 
/zk)ke ~  converges weakly to  /2,  if and only if the equation  in the lemma is true 
for every bounded and  continuous  function  f+ 
In the next section we show  that the pointwise convergence concept enables us 
to find an appropriate consistency concept. 
3.5.  Restrieti+m  on  eoncergence  q( assessmenl.s 
In  view  of  the  fact  that  strategies  and  beliefs  in  signaling  games  typically 
induce  non-continuous  functions,  we  regard  pointwise  convergence  as  a  natural 
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convergence  concept  to  define  consistency.  As  a  minimal  condition  for  an 
appropriate  consistency  concept,  we  require  that  almost  all  local  strategies  and 
local beliefs in the supporting sequence of assessments  should converge pointwise 
to the  local strategies  and  local beliefs  in the limit assessment. 
Condition  C.  Convergence  of assessments  w.r.t.  ~#  should  be  defined  in  such  a 
way that.  whenever (o  -~.  /3k)kc % converges to (~r.  /3)  w.r.t.  ~#.  there  is  a  dense 
subset in  T  such that (o'~k(t))k  ~ e4  converges pointwise to  o-~(t) for every  t  in this 
dense subset and (/3k(m))~ :. ~o  converges pointwise to  /3(m) for every  m  in some 
dense  subset  of M. 
3.6.  Appropriate  con.sistencv concepts 
The  final  condition  completes  the  framework  that  we  use  in  our  search  for 
appropriate  consistency concepts. 
Definition.  We  call  a  consistency concept  ~#  appropriate  if it  has  the  canonical 
form and  satisfies  conditions  A, B  and C. 
4. Strong consistency 
In this section we present a particular consistency concept, which we call strong 
consistency. 
We  call  an  assessment  (or.  /3)  strongly  consistent  if  there  is  a  sequence 
(crk,  /3k)a~,  of  assessments  that  are  Bayesian-consistent  and  pointwise  com- 
pletely mixed such that (o-tk(t))~ ~ ~  converges pointwise to  o-~(t)  for every  r and 
(/3k(m))~ ~ ~  converoes,_, pointwise  to  /3(m) for every,  m. 
To show that this is an appropriate consistency concept, we only have to prove 
that  strong  consistency  implies  Bayesian  consistency  since  it  is  clear  that  it 
satisfies  conditions  B  and  C.  The  proof  of this  fact  is  based  on  the  following 
lemma. 
Lemma 4.1.  Let X  be a  complete,  separahle metric ~v?ace. ( #~ )~ ~ ~  a  ,sequence (~[ 
probabiliu  measures  that  conrerges pointwise  to  a  probabiliu  measure  I*,  and 
(.fk)~ ~  a  sequence  q/" measurable  fimctions  /?om  X  to  [0,  1]  that  conrerges 
pointwise  to  a  measurable fimction /'.  Then 
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Proof.  Let  ~ >  0  be  given.  We  can  find  a  compact subset  K  with  p,(K)>  1 - 
e,  p3(K) >  l  -  e  for k  large enough, and  t j"k(x) -f(x)]  <  e  for all  x ~  K  and 
k  large  enough.  The  latter  follows  from  the  fact  that  pointwise  convergence  of 
functions  implies  almost  uniform  convergence.  Moreover,  the  pointwise  conver- 
gence  of (/zk)~,~  implies  that  ]fx f  d~ k-  fx,f.d/.tl  <  e  for large  k.  But  then. 
for large  k, 
I  fxfl~d.k- f/d~  I _< I  f/~d ~-  f/d g~[+I f,/d g~- f/ dg I 
-',v  "/X  •  "K 
<g.l+~:+~. 
which  leads to the conclusion that 
limff a dv?=f/dl*.  [] 
k~VX  • 
To  show  that  strong  consistency  implies  Bayesian  consistency,  we  need  one 
further lemma,  which can be found as Exercise  18.25(d) in Billingsley (1986). 
Lemrna  4.2.  Let  T,  M  be  metric  spaces,  [3  a  measurable function  on  M,  r  a 
probabilio"  measure on  T.  cr : T ~,~(  M  )  such  that the /~mction  t ~  o'( t ){ Ms )  is 
measurable for etem  M B  and  let the probabilio'  measure  P  on  M  be given  by 
P(M B):=£(r(t)(M  B)  dr,  for every  M B. 
Then  we ha~'e 
S  .{-,d.(,)]'.. 
Lemma  4.3.  Let  ((r k.  /3k)k ~ ~:,  be  a  sequence  of. Bayesian-consistent  assessments 
such  that  ({rlk(t))~ ~: r:~  com'erges pointwise  to  {r](t) .fbr ecerv  t  and  ( iSk( m))k ~ ~j 
comerges  pointwise  to  ~(m)  .fi)r  ecerv  m.  Then  the  assessment  (or,  ~)  is 
Bayesian-consistent. 
Proof.  Let T u  and  M B be Borel sets in  T and  M, respectively. First,  we show that 
=  ~(m)(TB)  dP  '~  lira f  /3~(,n)(TB)  dP"*  fw, 
Using Lemma 4.2  we obtain: 
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and 
Since  the  functions  m ,-> ~k(mXTv,)  are  measurable  functions  from  M  to  [0,  1] 
converging pointwise to the function  m ,-* ~(mXT B),  Lemma 4-. 1 implies 
limf /~k(,n)(TB)d~,k(t)= f.,9(,.)(T.)d~,(,). 
k  --~ ~  ,441 
Since  this holds  for ever),  t,  it follows  with  the  dominated  convergence  theorem 
that 
'im  L ,'(m)(TB)dP"<=ir[f,  /J(,,,)(TB)d.1(t)i  d~" 
k ~  7-  M  ~  l  I~ 
=f~ p{m)(r.)  dP". 
Furthermore,  the  functions  t ~  o'I~(t)(MB)  are  measurable  functions  from  T  to 
[0,  1], which converge pointwise to the function t ~  ~rl(t)(MB).  By the dominated 
convergence theorem, we obtain: 
,!i~.  f,..,<(,)(  M.I  dT: f~/.,(,  i(  M.l  d~'. 
Combining  these  two  results  and  using  the  fact that  (o  "k.  /3 k)  is  Bayesian-con- 
sistent leads to the conclusion that 
Sr  o-i(  t)(M~)  dT=/, ~-'-  >r~lim  f  o-ik(t)(MB)  d.:  N.I.  dP" 
= f%/B(m)(TB)dP". 
Since this holds for arbitrary  T  B and  M.  it follows that (or. /3) is Bayesian-con- 
sistent.  [] 
From  this  lemma  it  follows  directly  that  strong  consistency  implies  Bayesian 
consistency. 
Corollary 4.4.  Eterv strongly  consistent assessment  is Bayesian-consistent. 
This leads to the following conclusion. 
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5. Characterization of strong consistency 
In  this  section  we  give  a  characterization  of  strongly  consistent  assessments. 
Besides the  fact that  this characterization gives good insight into the  structure  of 
the  set of strongly consistent assessments,  it can  be  used  later to  show  that every 
appropriate consistency concept is a  refinement of strong consistency. 
Before  formulating  this  result  we  first  consider the  topological structure  of a 
separable metric space. We formulate several properties of such spaces in terms of 
the  message set  M. 
A  point  m e  M  is called  isolated  if {m}  is an open  subset of  M.  The  set of all 
isolated points of M  is denoted by Mi,,,. Note that  m ¢  Mi~,, if and only if there is 
an  a >  0  such  that  M  ~  Q.(m) =  {711}. A  point  in  M  that  is not  isolated is called 
an  accumulation  point of  M  and  M ......  denotes the set of all accumulation points 
of  M. 
In  the  proof  of  Theorem  5.2  we  make  use  of  the  following  property  of 
separable metric spaces. 
Lemma  5. I.  Let M  be a  separable metric .spac~' aTut let M  be a  countable dense 
subset of M.  Then 
(1)  lfm~M  ~M ........ ,  then  M  \{n~}  i.~  a  den.se  subset o/M. 
(2)  Mi,,, cM  . 
Theorem  5.2.  Let  1"  he a  sifnali7  ~, game aml let  ( ~r.  [3 )  be a  strongly consistent 
assessment.  Then  (~r.  ~  )  is Bayesian-consistent  amt  /3(m)  i,s  ah,solutelv  contimt- 
ous  with  rexpect  to  7  /~r et'erv  isolated point 717 ¢  M. 
Proqfi  We  already  know  that  strong  consistency  implies  Bayesian  consistency. 
Now.  let (or,  /3)  be  a  strongly consistent assessment  with  a  supporting  sequence 
(o  -k.  /3k)k~ri  and  let  meMi~ ..  Then,  for  a  Borel  sel  T,  with  r(T,)=0,  the 
Bayesian consistency of ( ~r ~,  /3 ~) implies that 
/3~(m)(T~).P'~'(m)  =1"  /3a(m')(Tl~ )  dP '~=j"  cr~(t)(m)  dr  O. 
J{ 
Because {171} is an open  subset of  M,  cr~"(r)(m) >  0  for all  t.  Hence. 
and 
P" I,,,)  ji,#t,}t,,l)  d:>O. 
£  ~v~( l)(,17)  dr 
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Since  this  relation  holds  for  any  k,  /3(m)(ir~)-0.  So  /3(m)  is  absolutely 
continuous with respect to  r.  [] 
The foregoing theorem describes a condition that is necessary for an assessment 
to  be  strongly consistent. In the  next theorem  we  show  that  this condition is also 
sufficient. 
Theorem  5.3.  Let  1"  be  a  signaling  game  and  let  (~r.  /3)  be  an  assessment.  I[ 
(o-.  /3 )  is Bavesian-c'onsistent  and  ~(m)  is absolutely  continuous  with  respect to 
r  .fi)r ecerv  isolated point m  •  M,  then  ( (r.  /3 )  is strongly consistent. 
The  proof  of  this  theorem  will  be  based  on  three  lemmas.  First.  we  need  some 
notation. 
Let  M'  =  {m 1,  m .....  }  be  a  countable  dense  subset  of  M  and  for  every 
m  ~  Mi~,,.  let  b(m): T~  ~  be  a  density function of  /3(m)  with respect  to  r  (i.e. 
/3(m)(T  B)  17  b(m)(t) dr  for  all  Tu).  Note  that  Radon-Nikodym's  theorem 
guarantees the  existence of this density function. 
For  k ~  %  we define the  mapping  ~k  : T ---,.//(M ) by 
I  I 
Then.  lim k~•  ~lk(t)(M  =  I.  because tbr all  k: 
l<a/(,)(M)_<  +~E  7  k+  =l+  +  Zw 
-  in,  I- 
Note  that ~,,,  1/i:  is finite since  M  "  is countable. For very  /< e  g,J  and  t •  T,  let 
Rk(t) :=  1/&lk(t)(M).  Obviously.  0  <  R a _<  1  is  measurable  on  f  for  all  k  and 
limk~_,_  Rk(t)=  l  for any  t. 
We consider the  behavior strategy,  cr~  ~ : T --,.:A(M).  with 
,~,~' (t)(M~)  :-  R~(t)  - a,~( t)(  M,~ ). 
for all  t  and  M B.  B~  Lemma 5.1.  the  set 
M'(k):-{m,•M  ....... l i>k}~M~,,cm 
is  dense  in  M.  So.  if  M B  is  an  open  set,  then  M*(k)~MB4={~.  Hence, 
o-]k(t)(M~) >  0  for  every  k  and  t,  which  implies  that  the  probability  measure 
o-((t) is  strictly positive. 
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The  proof  of  this  result  is  straightforward.  For  k ~  r~  and  Borel  set  T B,  we 
i n troduce: 
/?a(,,,)(TB)  := 
~B 
O'I]'(t)  (  ]~ )  dr 
~  O"lk(  /')(")  dr 
£ R~(t)  d,8(m) 
B 
fTRk(t)  d~(m) 
it"  m~M'(k). 
if  m~M*(k) 
(5.1) 
Note  that  the  two  denominators  in  this  definition  are  non-zero.  If,  lk)r instance. 
)TO'lk(t)(m)  dr =  0 for an  m e  M *(k),  then  G,~(t)(m) =  0.  r  almost everywhere. 
However. by construction.  G~k(t)(m)  >  0  for all  t. 
Lemma  5.5.  For  every  m,  the  sequence  ( [3k(m))~ ~ ~,  converges  pointwise  to 
~(m). 
Proqfi  (a)  If  m  g:M,~ o,  then  m¢M  (k)  for  large  k.  Then  the  dominated 
convergence theorem  implies  that for all  T B it  holds that 
,, dfl(,n) 
lim/3k( m)(  T~  )  -  -  ]3(  ,n )( TI~ ). 
*~ ~  £  d/3(,,7) 
(b) Let  m~M>o  and let  T B  be fixed.  Then {m} is  a  Borel  set and 
£/  ,-~(t)(m)  d~- 
= Qk*(t).  a,*(~)(,,,)  d~- 
1  1  .  [ 
= £flk(t).o',(t)(m)  dr+ 75-_~  7j,. Rk(,)  t,(,n)(t) 
Next we distinguish  two cases. 
"1 
vk+  dr. 
(5.2) 
(bl)  Suppose  that  (rO'l(t)(m) dr >  0.  By' the dominated convergence theorem: 
lim/  RX(l)trl(t)(m)d-~=fl  G,(t)(,n)dr,  for all  T B. 
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Hence, (5.1) in combination with (5.2) implies that 
£ ~l(O(m) dr 
lira/3k(m)(TB  = 
The Bayesian consistency of (or.  /3) implies that 
jT,frl(t)(m)  dr= f,,,f( m')( T~) dP"= /3( m)( TB) fr~rl( t)( m) dz. 
So 
/3(m)(TB)  =  =  lira/3k(m)(TB). 
frO't( t)( m) d~"  k~ 
(b2) Suppose that !ro'~(t)(m) d~-= 0. With (5.1) and (5.2) it follows that 
[  - ,f"Rk(t)  b(m)(t)  v k +  dr 
/3k(m)(TB)=  f  [  1] 
j~,Rk(t)  b(m)(t)  v  k +  -k  dr 
Together with the dominated convergence theorem this leads to 
frb(ml(t)  dr 
lira/3k(m)(T B) =  =/3(m)(T~). 
~-~ ~  frb( m)(t)  dr 
This completes the proof.  [] 
Lemma 5.6. F'or any k, (~r ~, ilk)  is Bayesian-consistent. 
Proof  In this proof k •  N is fixed. (a) For all  T  B and any Borel set M B cM  *(k): 
f,  /3~(m)(rB)  dP'~=  E  /3k(m)(TB)'P'~(m) 
M B  m ~  M 
meM,  P"~(m) 
=  F~  -,~S(t)(m)  d'~ 
m ~  M B 
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where the fourth equality is a consequence of the dominated convergence theorem. 
(b) In this part of the proof we  restrict ourselves to the  set  M' :- M\M *  (k). 
First, we introduce for every Borel subset  M~  of  M'  the measure  K(M~) on T as 
follows: for a  Borel set  T B, 
'  fTBO-I  '  K(M.)(TB) :=  (t)(Mt,) dT. 
The Bayesian consistency of (o-,  fi ) implies that 
K(M'B)(T~) = f  ~(m)(T~) dP" 
~m 
With the help of Lemma 4.2 this leads to 
Then for every Bore]  set  M~: 
p"~(M~) :  fR*(,).~,*(,)(M;,)d~-=  if*(,),  o-,(,)(M~)d~- 
So we may conclude that  m ~  .(rR~(t)  d  /3(m) is a density function  of  P<"  with 
respect to  P" on  M'.  Hence, for all  T~: 
:  L, 
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(c) Parts (a) and (b) imply that for all  T  B and  M~: 
~t  ~k( m)( TB)  dP '~ 
:  fv,  fia(m)(TB)  dP'~'+  fw  ~a(m)(TF')  dP"~ 
a~',M  "(k)  ,~ ..,'vl " ( k ) 
=  ~M~(a))  dr+ f  ,rlx(t)(Ma\M*(k))  dr 
= f,;a,*(t)(M.)  dr. 
This completes the proof of the theorem.  E 
Corollary" 5.7.  Let  F  be a signaling  game and let (o',  fi )  be an assessment.  Then 
(o-,  ~  )  is  strongly  consistent  if and  onh"  if  (o-,  fi )  is  Bayesian-consistent  and 
~(m)  is absoluteh,  continuous  with  respect  to  v  fi)r every  isolated point  m  ~  M. 
Using this characterization,  we can investigate the consequences of strong consis- 
tency in  some special classes of signaling games. 
Corollary  5.8.  lf  the  message  space  ~ta  signaling  game  contains  no  isolated 
points  or the  ~.'pe  space  is discrete,  strong  consistency  i.~ equivalent  to  Bm, esian 
consistency. 
In particular, this holds for finite and discrete signaling games. 
Corollary  5.9.  If the  message  space  of a  signaling  game  is discrete  and  the  O,pe 
space  is  not.  then  an  assessment  is  strongly  consistent  ~[" and  only  i["  it  is 
Bayesian-consistent  and el(m)  is absolutely  continuous  w. r.t.  r  )Cor every message 
m. 
6. Other consistency concepts 
In the following theorem we show that every assessment that ~s consistent w.r.t. 
some appropriate definition  ¢  automatically satisfies the conditions of the charac- 
terization  in  the previous section and  is,  therefore,  strongly consistent.  So,  every 
appropriate consistency concept is a refinement of strong consistency. 
Theorem  6.1.  Let  ~  be  an  appropriate  consistency  concept.  If an  assessment 
(o',  ~)  is  consistent  w.r.t,  q:  then  (o-,  ~)  is  Bayesian-consistent  and  ~(m)  is 
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Proof  Let  q~  be  an  appropriate  consistency  concept  and  (or,  /3)  a  consistent 
assessment  w.r.t.  ~  with  a  supporting  sequence  (o  -k,  /3k)k~j.  Since  ¢  is 
appropriate,  (or,  /3) must be Bayesian-consistent. 
Now,  take an  arbitrary  isolated point  m ~  M.  Then,  {m} is open  and  therefore 
T ×  {m} is an open  subset of  T X M.  By condition  B; 
P~ ( m) = frcrlk( t)( m)  d~-> 0, 
for ever?  k.  Since (o  -k,  /3 k) is Bayesian-consistent,  it follows that 
/3k(m)(T,).  P'~(m)  =  f{m}/3 k (m') dP '~= fr o-1~(  t)(m) dr, 
for every  T B,  which  means that 
fro',k(t)(m)  dr 
/3k( m)(r,)  = 
P"~(m) 
for ever?'  T B.  If r(TB)=0,  we  have  /3k(m)(T~)=0  for every  k.  Since  m  is  in 
every dense  subset of  M, condition  C  implies that  /3~(m) converges pointwise to 
/3(m),  which  implies  that  /3(mXTB)=  limk~  /3k(mXTB)= 0.  Hence,  /3(m)  is 
absolutely  continuous  w.r.t.r.  [] 
In view of Corollary 5.7,  w'e arrive at the  following  conclusion. 
Theorem  6.2. Ecera, appropriate  consistency  concept  is  a  refinement  of strong 
consistency. 
In  the  following  example  we  consider  a  signaling  game  in  which  strong 
consistency  excludes  some  sequential  equilibria.  By  Theorem  6.2  it  follows  that 
every appropriate consistency  concept excludes  these equilibria. 
Example 2. Let  F  be a signaling game in which T =  [0,  1], M  =  {y,  n},  A =  {b,  c} 
and  r  is the uniform distribution  on  T.  The payoffs are given by 
ut(t.  m,  a):=0,  for all  t,  m, a, 
t,  if  a  =  b, 
u:(t,  m, a):=  0,  if  a=c. 
We define  the assessment (o-,  /3) by 
f6,,  if  t=0, 
O'l(t)  :=  ~6,,  if  t>0, 
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o-_~(n)  :=  a/,. 
/3(_~')  ::  a0, 
/3(~)  :--~-. 
It can be shown  that (or,  /3  is a  sequential equilibrium. However. (or.  /3) is not 
strongly consistent,  since  /3(3') is not absolutely continuous  w.r.t.  7-.  [] 
7.  Structurally consistent assessments 
Finally, we consider a different form of consistency as introduced by Kreps and 
Wilson  (1982).  They  call  an  assessment  structurally  consistent  if  for  every 
information  set there  is a  behavior strategy profile such  that  this  information  set 
will be reached with positive probability and the beliefs at this information set are 
completely determined by  BaTes"  rule.  If we  formulate this concept for signaling 
games, we obtain the following definition. 
Delqnition.  An  assessment  (or,  /3)  is  called  structurally  consistent  if for  every 
m e  M  there is a  BSP K  such  that  Pa(m)  >  O,  and tot every  TB: 
f~ 
K,(t)(m)  d~- 
/3(m)(TB)  =  P~(m) 
In  the  following  theorem  we  characterize  the  class  of  structurally  consistent 
assessments in signaling games with at least two messages. 
Theorem  7. 1.  For  a  signaling  game  with  at  least  two  dii~'erent  messages,  an 
assessment  ( ~r.  /3 )  is structurally  consistent  if and only i[, for ez'er)' m.  there is a 
constant  c m >  0  such  that for all  TB : 
/3( ,n)( TB)  <_ ~,,, . "~( T~). 
Proof  " ~  " Let (or,  /3) be a  structurally consistent assessment and  m  a  message 
in  M.  By definition, there is a  BSP ~  such that  P"(m)  >  0  and for any  TB: 
J:  0"1( t)(m)  dr  1 
/3( m)( TB)  --  <  --7(  TB). 
P~(m)  P"(m) 
Now  choose c,,,  :=  l/P;~(m). 
" ~'  Suppose, for every  m. there  is a  constant  c,,, >  0  such that for all  T B  we 
have  /3(mXTB)<C,, ' .T(TB).  Then,  obviously,  /3(m)  is  absolutely  continuous 
w.r.t.  ~"  for every  m. 446  A.  Perea y  ~ton.~'uw~ el at./' Journal o/,14athematicat Ecommlic.~ 27 (1997) 425  449 
Let  m  ~  M  and  let  b(m): T--+ J~ be a  density  function  of  /3(m)  with  respect to 
r.  Then.  for any  TB: 
fT  ....  £  c,,;  dr  ,~  /~(,n)(t)  dr  /3(,n)(Ts)_<~,,,  r(f~) 
Hence,  there  is  a Borel  set  T~  with  r(Ts)=  1.  such  that  b(m)(l)_< c,,  for  all 
t ~  T B.  To define  a  behavior strategy, K]  for player  l,  we  take  a  message  ~  :/= m 
in  M.  If  t¢  TI~',  then  let  Kl(t)  be  an  arbitrary  probability  measure  on  M. 
Otherwise,  for a  Borel  set  Ms: 
1, 
~(t)(M~):=  J  ~'"'  " 
1  ;,(,n)(;) 
J  [, 
~0, 
Then. 
itmeM  R and,~eM  u, 
if m¢M  R and  theM  u, 
it ;, ~  M~  and  ;~ ~  M s, 
otherwise. 
P~(,,,)  =  £,; a,(l)(;n)  dr =  f;,~  -- 
t,(  ,,)(  ; ) 
( 'IH 
dr 
f?(,.)(¢)  l  l  1- 
-  j  dr:  =  -  >  o. 
Furthermore.  for any  T B' 
£<(,)(,.) d~  £  a,t,t(,,,t  dr  1/,,,,f  ~(,.)(,)  dr 
Pa(m)  P~(m)  l/c,. 
f  b(,n)(t) dr  /3(m)(TB). 
)"B 
So (o-.  /3)  is  structurally consistent.  [] 
From the  above theorem  it follows that every  structurally consistent  assessment 
(or,  /3) must  have the property that the  local belief  /3(m)  is absolutely continuous 
w.r.t,  v  for every  m. 
Consider.  for instance,  an  infinite  signaling game  with  T =  M  =  [0,  1],  r  equal 
to  the  uniform  distribution  on  T  and  an  assessment  (o-,  /3)  in  which  /3(0)=  6 0. 
Such  an  assessment  is  ruled  out  by  structural  consistency,  since  /3(0)  is  not 
absolutely continuous  w.r.t.r. ,4.  Perea v Mon~uwJ et al. /  Journal ql Mathematicat  Ecom,nics 27 ( 1997;  425-449  447 
Appendix 
Proof  of Lemma  3.2.  It  can  be  shown  easily  that  every  sequence  (/.z*)k~ 
satisfying the condition  in the  lemma is pointwise  convergent to  tt  by choosing  f 
equal  to the  indicator function  on  the  Borel  set  X~. 
Now.  let  (#~),~,  be  pointwise  convergent  to  #  and  let  f  be  a  bounded 
measurable  function  on  X.  Without  loss  of generality,  we  assume  that  f:  X---, 
(0,  1).  For every  k.  we define  the  sets: 
A,(k):=  x  f(x)  >_~  .  i=0  .....  k 
and 
i-[  i  I  B i(k)  :=  x  ~  <.f(x)  <  ~  >.  i=  1 .....  k. 
By the definition  of the  integral,  we  have  for every  k: 
k  i--1  ~"  i 
E  ~.  ~(B,(k))_<f/dt*_<E~tz(B,(k)). 
i=1  •  t=l 
Since 
~  i-1  1  k 
E~-I~(B(k))=  7-E#(A,(k))  and 
t=l  t=l 
~  i  1  1  k 
=--+  ~l#(Ai(k)  )  ,=  ~.(,9(k))  k  k,= 
it follows  that 
1  k  1  1 
E.(  ,~,(kl) _< .~.f/ d~ ~ ;  -- ;. E,~( .~,(kl).  7 
i=  l =  ] 
Similarly,  we can  show  that 
1  /'  1  I  ;"  _<  _<-+  ,E,.'(a,(k)).  7~,E, ~'(a'(k))  ff d~  k 
=  •  = 
These  inequalities  imply that 
1  k 
f/d~,  = 2~5 ;E~(= a,(k)), 
and 
1  k 
lira f  f d~? =  lira -  Y'.#k(Ar(k)). 448  A.  Perea  ~ Monsuw~ el aL /  Journal qf MaHwmalical Economics 27 !1997) 425  449 
Therefore,  it suffices to show that 
1  k  1  k 
Assume that this  were not true.  Then,  w.l.o.g.,  there  is  a  fi >  0  such that 
Ixk(Ai(k))-T~_,tx(A,(k)}  >_~,  forall  k. 
l'=l 
So, for every k, there is an integer i t _< k  such that  I #k(A,(k)) -  ~(A, (k)) I >_ 6. 
Without  loss  of generality,  we  may  assume  that  #k( A, (k)) >_ 6-- tz(Ai(k))  for 
every  k.  Since 0 _< (it/k) _<  I. the sequence  ik/k  contains a monotone convergent 
subsequence.  Without  loss  of generality,  we  assume  that  the  sequence  ik/k  is 
monotone and convergent. 
Case  1.  ik/k"  r  for some  re  [0.  1].  Then,  by construction,  Ai, ' (k +  1) cA,(k) 
for every  k,  and 
f"lAi, =A := {xlf(x)  _> r}. 
k 
Since  /,/(Ai(k) ) > #,,(Ai(1))  for I >_ k,  it follows that 
**'(adk) ) > a+ u(a,,(l)),  for/>_ k, 
and.  therefore, 
lim#'(A,~(k))  >_ a+  lim /x( &,( l ) ).  for every  k. 
t-~r-  t-~v- 
By  assumption,  limit,,  tc'(Xu)=  p.(X u)  for  every  Borel  set  X B,  so 
lim ~  ~ ~_  p]( A,( k )) =  p.(A,(k)).  Furthermore.  by the monotone convergence theo- 
rem,  lim,.  ~ ~  #(A,(I)) = Ix(A). Combining these facts leads to the conclusion that 
tz(ai,(k))>a+p,(a),  forevery  k. 
However, this  implies  that 
lim/,(a,~(k))  >_ 6 ~- #(A). 
k--+m 
which contradicts the  fact that  lira,  .~  #(A,(k))  =  #(A). 
Case 2.  ik/k ,~ r  for some  re  [0.  1]. Then.  by construction.  A;~. (k +  1)DAi(k) 
for every  k  and 
UA*(k)  >r} 
k 
Since  p](A  (k)) >  bC'(A  {1)) for k >/,  it follows that 
tt~(a,,(k))>_6+#(a,,(l)),  fork>l. ,4.  Perea 3" Mousuwg el al. // Journal ql Malhemal*cal Ecolum+ic.s  27 (1997) 425  449  449 
and 
lim/Z(Ai~(k))>6+/a.(a  (/)),  forevery  /. 
/,-  --+  ;c 
By  the  monotone  convergence  theorem,  lim k  +~  #~(Ai,(k))=/Z(A).  Together 
with  the  inequality  above,  we  obtain  t,](A)>__  <5+ Ix(Ai{I))  for every  1.  which 
implies  that  lim/~ ~  /a](A)>_~+lim]+~  #(A (I)).  However,  this  leads  to  a 
contradiction,  since  lim] ~,+  p](A)  =  #(A)  and  lim+, +:~  /x(A  (1)) =  ,u.(A).  [] 
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